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Abstract:  
Through analysing the link between fictitious capital and social reproduction, this 
article shows how the increased circulation of fictitious capital leads to the re-
emergence of personal forms of domination. This re-emergence of personal forms of 
domination takes place in the context of the impersonal domination that structures 
capitalist social relations. However, since fictitious capital is not a product of 
production, it therefore has not gone through the valorisation process necessary for 
the realisation of capital. Thus, fictitious capital represents unrealised value. In order 
to account for this inconsistency, fictitious capital is premised on a contract (debtor-
creditor) that makes a claim on future labour, and therefore the valorisation of 
fictitious capital is suspended and accounted for by the dependence on the 
valorisation process to occur in the future, with its premise in future labour rather 
than past as in the case of realised capital. This temporal discordance results in 
placing increased pressure on social reproduction, a function that insures the 
reproduction of labour power, a variable at the heart of the justification of the 
circulation of fictitious capital. Significantly, this re-emergence of personal forms of 
domination is not solely based on the relation of the debt contract, as the debtor 
might not be a worker or even an individual but a bank or a hedge fund, but also the 
personal relations that uphold the ability for society to as a whole to reproduce the 
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labour power that will in the future account for the repayment of the debt. Therefore, 
personal forms of domination implicated in social reproduction of labour power re-
emerge as a site with increased pressure as a result of an increased circulation of 
fictitious capital. 
 
Keywords: Fictitious capital, personal domination, social reproduction, time, 
value-form. 
 
In a footnote to the chapter ‘The Transformation of Money into Capital,’ in Capital 
Volume One, Marx makes a brief reference metaphorically establishing the 
distinction between personal relations of domination and impersonal power 
structured by money in capitalist societies.  
 
The antagonism between the power of landed property, based on personal 
relations of domination and servitude, and the power of money, which is 
impersonal, is clearly expressed by the two French proverbs, “Nulle terre sans 
seigneur” and “L’argent n’a pas de maitre. (‘No land without its lord’ and 
‘Money has no master.)’”1   
 
 Impersonal domination is the form of domination structuring the function of 
the fetish character in capitalist societies, where social relations objectified in things 
dominate and act on people. This means that people relate to each other indirectly 
through things and hence this form of domination is impersonal or based on ‘rule by 
abstractions.’2 The social form behind this rule by abstractions is described by Marx 
in his theory of valorisation which shows how value is extracted from labour time to 
create surplus value: the premise for the accumulation of capital. This process of 
abstraction renders labour time to be both abstract and concrete. Abstract labour 
being labour measured by time and appropriated into value on the one hand, and 
concrete labour making up the actual physical labour that contributes to producing 
things on the other. Abstract labour time then becomes the premise of the mode of 
abstract domination, entailing that in capitalist societies we are dominated by time.3 
This theory of valorisation is a mechanism based on the understanding that in 
capitalist social relations, through the abstraction of labour time into value, human 
sociality is objectified in and redirected through the circulation of value embedded in 
commodities. A process that bases itself on the exploitation of the special commodity 
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of labour, aiming towards the end goal of perpetually increasing the production of 
capital or realised value. However, with increased financialization based on the 
circulation of credit, money in circulation is not necessarily money that has been 
valorised byway of the process of abstraction generated within the circulation 
process. This form of money is referred to by Marx as fictitious capital. Fictitious 
capital, capital that has been credited in the form of money, represents future 
valorised capital and therefore represents a form of capital that is not yet valorised 
and therefore exists based on the suspension of its valorisation process. While 
although fictitious capital is a form of money and therefore represents the 
mechanism of impersonal forms of domination, what I will demonstrate is that within 
the particular structural relation of capital’s reproduction process where fictitious 
capital finds itself, the increased use of fictitious capital results in the re-emergence 
of directly personal forms of domination.  
The basic premise of the argument is that, since there is no realisation of 
capital without valorisation (verwertung) there is therefore also no realisation of 
capital without circulation, where capital is accumulated from production and thus 
labour. Since fictitious capital is not a product of the circulation of value, there is no 
moment of capital realisation for this form of capital. This means that the forms of 
abstract domination imposed by the circulation of the value-form does not fully 
determine the nature of the particular social relationship involved in credit 
operations. This leads to the second proposition that credit means debt and 
therefore the subjects or bearers of this operation are not involved in the process as 
subjects to the value-form only, but are also creditors and debtors and so they are 
also subject to another form of power relation. Finally, building on these two points, 
the particular power relation involved in credit operations has a personal dimension 
of dependency, which in turn is premised on the realisation of capital through the 
valorisation process. Further, this personal form of domination at the centre of this 
debt contract is not wholly without its own abstractions as “to receive a ‘juridical 
qualification’ [the contract] is inscribed in a legal system marked by its abstract 
universality.”4 Thus it is not abstraction qua abstraction that makes the value-form 
based on impersonal domination, but that there are no personalised agents that 
represent the abstraction of value-form as in the case with legal contracts that are 
represented by an owner or a group of owners who are people. Hence there are 
different modalities of abstraction,5  and what makes the form of abstract domination 
imposed by the value-form impersonal is not the abstraction itself but rather that the 
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actor representing the abstraction is not a person but rather a thing. Value, a product 
of human labour, when moving from one commodity form to the other itself 
becomes an independent actor, what Marx terms the ‘automatic subject.’6 
Crucially this re-emergence of personal forms of domination is not only based 
on the relation of the debt contract but also the personal relations that uphold the 
ability for society to reproduce the labour power that will in the future account for the 
repayment of the debt. Therefore, personal forms of domination implicated in social 
reproduction re-emerge as a site with increased pressure as a result of an increased 
circulation of fictitious capital. This is because society as a whole is struggling to not 
only produce capital in the present but also to make up for the fictitious capital that is 
in use. This means presupposing the reproduction of labour power and the 
conditions of production in the future as well as the present. However, these 
personal forms of power relations come into being by the very process of exchange 
that is described abstractly by Marx as completely impersonal and formal based on 
the ‘high-level logic of abstraction’7 intrinsic to the value-form, since in capitalist 
societies the social relations of credit operations are built on the social relations of 
the value-form. Hence the phenomenon of personal forms of dependency coming to 
the fore byway of the suspension of valorisation with fictitious capital, does not mean 
that abstract forms of domination are not also present nor that the juridical 
qualification behind the debt contract is not itself a form of abstraction. Rather this 
means that the abstract forms are upheld by personal forms of domination 
functioning in the realm of the reproduction of capitalist social relations that internally 
include the reproduction of labour power (everyday life composed of personal 
relationships that sustain one’s ability to labour). In this way, we find the conditions 
for the re-emergence of the exploitation of forms of domination that have been 
manipulated to uphold reproductive aspects of capital production, within the process 
of capital valorisation itself. With ‘fictitious capital’ directly personal power relations 
come to the fore, facilitated by the impersonal power of commodity fetishism. As 
Harvey notes “the credit system becomes the locus of intense factional struggles and 
personal power plays within,”8 while Shulamith Firestone rightly predicted with 
increasing technologization of the mode of production that facilitates the 
unprecedented amount of fictitious capital in circulation, “cybernation may aggravate 
the frustration that women already feel in their roles.”9  With the dominance of 
‘fictitious capital,’ social reproduction relies on an intensification and aggregation of 
personal power where power structures functioning from the point of view of outside 
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of the production process re-emerge within the process of capital valorisation in a 
renewed way, yet under different structural relations.  
In order to show how fictitious capital re-centres these forms of ‘personal 
power’ internal to social reproduction of both labour power and capitalist societies as 
a whole, and thus also how fictitious capital re-centres power relations that ‘appear’ 
as external to the process of capital valorisation, we will need to first understand 
what Marx meant by fictitious capital and how fictitious capital relates to the 
impersonal domination exemplary of the role of money. Following this we will 
analyse what role fictitious capital plays in the context of Marx’s theory of capital 
valorisation by undertaking analysis of value-form. Finally, we will merge our findings 
of the implications regarding increased fictitious capital within the process of capital 




While fictitious capital, a concept referred to by Marx in Capital Volume Three, 
has largely been left idle and loosely defined, it now finds itself in the centre of 
discussions and elaborations concerning the forms and effects of financialization. 
What Marx means by fictitious capital is the practical use of one form of value more 
than once, indicating that the multiplication of the use of one thing involves a fictional 
element. This dynamic occurs in the case of credit operations as credited value is at 
once owned by the creditor and practically used by the debtor (who could be an 
individual or a manager of money representing a banking or investment operation). 
Fictitious capital is lent money that represents a title to future value, functioning as a 
fictitious appearance of the original money still owned by the lender. This copy 
mimics the original with the exception that its valorisation is suspended, despite 
being considered inevitable. The suspension of inevitable valorisation is constitutive 
of fictitious capital itself because it’s very valorisation (repayment) is the cause of its 
disappearance.  It is through charging interest that this form of money is able to 
generate more money described by Marx as M-M1  opposed to M-C-M1  which 
indicates that more money is generated due to its role in the circulation process that 
requires the mediation of commodity. The 21st century has seen a cyclical moment in 
the capitalist mode of production where we find the intensification of the function of 
the credit system and the use of ‘fictitious capital,’ accompanied by technological 
change. This intensification has changed the quality of how capital generates profit 
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through exploitation and subjection of members of capitalist society. Further, this 
change in quality of capital exploitation has a temporal component. When a single 
form of value exists twice, the doubling of that value involves a temporal 
displacement in the process of valorization. For the value to exist twice and thus to 
contain a fictional element, the second use of the value is upheld by the anticipation 
of future production that is understood to represent the second manifestation of 
value. However, this second value-form is not yet valorized which is why it needs to 
become represented as a fictitious token or entitlement. If the loan is repaid to the 
lender, the fictitious aspect of the said value disappears. In this way, fictitious capital 
is never valorized since it is a placeholder waiting for the appearance of a second 
form of value to arrive from the future. At the moment the debt is paid the fictitious 
capital disappears and the value returns to its original form as functioning as one, 
hence fictitious capital is never realized capital.  
Fictitious capital first plays a role in Volume One of Capital before Marx 
develops the role of the credit system, standing in for the monetary form as credit-
money. Credit-money first appears in the dynamic of simple circulation as a 
symptom of the role of time in the practical development of value, as value moves 
from one form to another in its ultimate production of surplus-value and later 
capital. Within simple circulation there are two initial roles played by time: labour 
time (both concrete and abstract) and the time of circulation. Labour time is 
operatively used as a measure of value while the time of circulation is concerned 
with empirical time or the time it takes for capital to circulate throughout social 
relations. It is due to the non-linearity of the C-M-C relation that requires the 
modification of credit-money. That is Marx “saw credit as a modification of the 
commodities/money/commodities exchange, which in a market circulation mode 
necessarily takes place in a simultaneous manner”10 i.e. in the case that the 
commodity buyer does not and cannot pay in hard cash. Due to the expected future 
hard cash the exchange promises, credit steps in not only to play the role of future 
money, but to create the conditions of possibility for future money. As such, credit-
money must be non-synchronic with the accumulation of capital in order to fulfil its 
role in the facilitation of commodity exchange. By necessity credit exists within an 
aleatory temporality in order to fill in for the temporal contradictions in the logic of 
capital accumulation. As de Brunhoff claims, credit does not share temporality with 
capital.11 Thus, credit introduces time as a form determination of value in its money-
form, within the process of simple circulation; a complex formulation that will be 
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described in detail as we develop the argument further. These temporal 
discrepancies represent a discordance that comes into being in order to 
compensate for temporal inconsistencies found in the social form of capital 
accumulation as a whole.   
The function of credit-money within the context of simple circulation is 
referred to as ‘commercial credit’ and forms the basis of the development of the 
credit system.12 As a direct product of the use of money as a means of payment, 
commercial credit (or simple credit money) is at once no longer simple money-
form, and not yet indicative of the role of credit within the credit system. Hence, 
commercial credit can be found  
 
on the borderline between the monetary system and the credit system. 
Incorporated into the later, it introduces into it the contradiction 
inherent in the function of money as a means of payment, which 
represents simultaneously the ultimate dematerialization of money and 
its re-embodiment.13 
 
When credit-money fills in the role for money as means of payment, credit-money 
makes clear its role as a form determination (and not an objective thing with 
inherent value) since what is necessary about the money-form operatively is that 
something stands in for the form in order to ensure its role. However, money’s ‘re-
embodiment’ in the form of credit-money presents problems in terms of what 
constitutes its monetary character as it represents both less and more than money. 
Less in the sense that it stands in for future money, and more in the sense that it is 
up held by an additional juridical contract, one that is based on the debtor-creditor 
relationship. A contractual relationship that is additional to the basic formal contract 
that money already abstractly represents. Further, credit-money bases itself on the 
circulation of debts and thus is the “non-circulation of money.”14 Yet credit-money 
has by necessity ‘monetary characteristics’ as a medium of circulation and a 
measure of value, albeit a measure of value with a different temporal relationship to 
production. It is this temporal difference that brings about the problematic of 
money’s non-equivalence to credit-money.  That is, the measure of value by credit 
money cannot be fulfilled in a direct way as future value (the kind of value bared by 
credit-money) has not yet come into being. Although the credit money stands in for 
future value in a nominal way, it cannot confirm the existence of future value and 
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thus as it bears the form of the form of value and not value directly embedded in a 
form. Hence credit-money’s monetary characteristics carry a purely theoretical 
significance and does not indicate practical convertibility. As de Brunhoff shows, 
 
the first function of money, that of the measure of values, cannot be directly 
fulfilled by credit money. In that sense, “credit money” is only ‘money in so far 
as it absolutely takes the place of actual money to the amount of its nominal 
value.’ But this convertibility has only theoretical significance; in normal times 
it does not in any way imply an effective convertibility.15 
 
While it is clear that credit-money thus can only act as money-form due to its nature 
as containing monetary characteristics, it follows that credit-money cannot merely 
replace the function of money. This is because the temporal inadequacies will 
ultimately reveal themselves in a time of crisis when there is no longer speculative 
evidence for the reproduction of future value as this forms the basis of the debtor-
creditor contract. In the case of the lack of speculation that the future will bring the 
reproduction of value as seen in times of crisis, credit-money loses its ‘credibility’ as 
a stand in for money-form and will need to be replaced by the money-form proper.  
Fictitious capital, based on an institutional relationship between two parties, 
essentially splits the money-form into two. This split is governed by a legal contract 
acting as a claim over money. Here we find two opposed legal subjects, the debtor 
on one side and the creditor on the other.  Money thus takes on two forms. The first 
form, in the case of the creditor’s relationship to the money, is one in which the 
money becomes a ‘unit of account’ for a sum that is due in the future, while the 
debtor holds money that represents their future labour. It is this labour that will then 
produce money to act as a means of payment for the settlement of the debt. This 
relationship is “a specifically constrained institutional relationship that is governed 
by contract and law,”16 added on top of the always already institutional nature of 
money as legitimised by the state in the first instance.  However, this former 
relationship is necessary for the temporal manifestation of the credit relationship.17 
That is, the contract functions to legally uphold the manipulation of time in order to 
insert money into the circulation process. Money that ultimately ‘would have been’ 
the result of the process and not present in earlier stages. Credit-money, in order to 
act as a form determination of the money-form, bases itself on the subjection of the 
representatives of the owner of the money used to create credit-money and the 
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owner of the future-money, to each other in co-dependency. This co-dependency is 
secured, not by the dynamics of capital accumulation premised on the value-form, 
but by a legal contract. Here credit-money as a form of appearance of value, 
appearing from the future, becomes implicated in the bearer of the form. This brings 
full circle the two concepts of time developed so far (abstract labour time and the 
empirical time of social practice found in the realm of the circulation of capital) 
through their shared structural role in implicating the subject in the abstraction of 
the value-form. ‘Labour time’ supplies the content of the measure of value in its form 
of representation as money, while the debtor supplies the solution to circulation’s 
temporal inconsistencies through supplying future labour time as content to the 
measure of its value in credit-money. Thus, there is no function of ‘time’ as an 
abstract form underpinning capital accumulation without subjection.18  However 
there is more than one kind of subjection at work that corresponds to different 
temporal categories; subjection to value-form on the one hand and subjection to 
future valorization on the other. The later form anticipates future subjection to the 
value-form based on the ‘personal’ memory of one’s past. This indicates a 
suspension of subjection to the subsumptive function of value-form. A function that, 
although remains latent, is replaced by a different kind of subjection, one that is 
based on a personal relationship of dependency made up of a different temporal 
function that involves one’s use of memory and anticipation of future. While, 
subjection to the value-form is a kind of subjection based on the Hegelian claim 
that the subject is a formally determined empty place holder. This indicates that the 
subject is constituted by practice that is historically determined by social-form and 
thus a product of phenomena and therefore substantial. We become a product of 
what we do and what we do is conditioned historically. While subjection to the debt 
contract maintains within its concept the Kantian transcendental subject, 
determined based on its opposition to object, that internally contains a component 
of individual humanity that has an ‘ego,’ an object of inner sense that appears as 
substantial (an illusion that gives us the ground for an ego), resonating in the 
freedom to act with a moral ‘personality.’19 This entails a focus on ego that can lead 
to misrepresentations of the ‘will’ as Nietzsche points out the false belief that ‘l’effet, 
c’est moi.’20 Each side, representing two paradigms that cannot be strictly said to be 
independent of one another.  It is the significance of the temporal implications of 
money and its subsequent forms of appearance that provides a central link 
between the abstract self-movement of the value-form (based on abstract labour-
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time) forming the temporality of capital, and the temporality of the individual 
subject. A subject that is implicated in the temporality of capital by the temporalizing 
nature of social practice that may or may not be effected by the temporality of the 
value-form.  It is from this point of view of the individual subject where we find the 
temporal site of personal forms of domination. 
 
The Implication of Fictitious Capital for Value-Form  
 
In Marx there are different expressions of the commodity form including the 
object-commodity of production, labour as commodity and the money commodity. 
Thus, what makes a commodity a commodity is not its materiality but rather its social 
form. However, different appearances of the commodity form will constitute different 
social relationships with different temporal structures that are cause for different 
outcomes.  For example, in the case of the exchange of a service the only difference 
between a material product and an immaterial one is that they have a different 
relationship to the timing of production and consumption. According to Heinrich, “the 
difference between services and physical objects consists of a distinction of the 
material content; the question as to whether they are commodities pertains to their 
social form, and that depends upon whether objects and services are exchanged.”21 
Here presence of so-called immaterial labour does not entail a need to re-examine 
Marx’s value theory since the social form remains the same. With immaterial labour 
we see a temporal shift because production and consumption happen 
simultaneously rather than through the mediation of an objective (and thus future) 
use-value since there remains the mediation of use-value with the phenomenon of 
instantaneous consumption. In this dynamic the commodity does not require its 
objective form, just like how money does not need its objective form (gold standard) 
in order to fulfil its function as a form-determination of the commodity as universal 
equivalent distinct from all other commodities. While money has a use value (it is 
used as a mode of value’s circulation) and an exchange value (it represents a 
quantity of value) and therefore is an expression of the commodity form, when 
functioning as fictitious capital its use value is the latent potential to create greater 
value. Thus its value is entirely irrational, as to quote Marx “the value of its value is 
that it produces greater value.”22 And therefore we find that fictitious capital has a use 
value but no definable value, indicating that it does not involve the material 
production process where we find the embodiment of labour embedded in it as in a 
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commodity form.23 According to Harvey the primary role of the money ‘commodity’ is 
to function as “a medium of circulation as its use value is that it facilitates the 
circulation of commodities,”24 and therefore, as Harvey continues, “from the 
standpoint of a pure medium of circulation, money can equally well take any number 
of forms.”25 It is because money represents the universal equivalent of exchange 
value, money is essentially opposed to other commodities as, “money assumes an 
independent and external power in relation to exchange because, as the universal 
equivalent, it is the very incarnation of social power.”26 Thus we can see that the 
reliance on the gold standard as the objective form of money was, rather than a 
necessary component of Marx’s critique, a formation he assumed as one stage in the 
process of the development of the money commodity. Using this same logical frame, 
for Heinrich, it is not a problem for Marx’s theory of value to merely replace the 
objective use-value component of a commodity with an exchange of property, as the 
result of a temporal shift.  
This observation is important in maintaining the way in which we think about 
the relationship between value-form and labour, even in the case of the exchange of 
fictitious capital, where Marx shows we find that capital accumulation ‘appears’ to 
occur without the mediation of production. This is because the M-M formation 
nonetheless relies on labour to generate value in the first place. However, what 
happens when capital that is valorised through labour is no longer is the site that 
extracts the predominant quantity of value within the process of the accumulation of 
capital? In neglecting the meaningful repercussions of a temporal shift in the 
relationship between production and consumption Heinrich does not see the 
possibility that a temporal shift has the power to have social implications that exceed 
what can be accounted for through the value-form analysis of commodity as the 
object of the production process.  It is a temporal shift in the relationship between 
production and consumption that differentiates the object commodity of production 
from the money commodity of fictitious capital. In fictitious capital, the producer 
receives a sum of equivalence for an exchange-value before they produce what will 
account for this exchange value, while the owner of capital essentially owns the 
speculative future production. This formulation, marked by a temporal shift, means 
that the relationship is no longer a relationship of exchange where equality is 
constructed between two things, as Macherey puts it, “so as to have value appear 
and destroy things.”27 This is because the subsumptive force of exchange in the 
construction of equivalents in the movement towards valorisation is only retroactively 
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constituted (or made real) after the capital has been valorised. Following the position 
of the Neue Marx-Lekture, value remains abstract or immaterial and thus not yet 
valorised until the final exchange in the commodity market. While fictitious capital 
acts as exchange-value when used on the market and creates profit through interest, 
it does not create value.  This is due to a temporal difference in the process since 
valorisation has not yet occurred.  To maintain this formation, while the money 
engages in relationships of exchange, the bearer of the fictitious capital is tied to the 
money-form beyond the performance of this exchange, in a relationship of 
dependency that is directly personal as it involves social relations that are 
unmediated by value-form to uphold its legitimacy. Something symptomatic of the 
latent effectivity of value before the final exchange of the commodity.28  
A temporal shift entails the restructuring of social relationships and therefore 
the nature of subjection. For fictitious capital to exist there must be no moment of 
valorisation of capital because valorisation is suspended and replaced by a person 
who represents the guarantee that in the future they will extend their labour. This 
bearer of fictitious capital represents, as Marx puts it, a “claim” or “legal title to future 
production.”29 If we consume first and produce later, the later production is 
determined by a form of subjection that functions to ensure future labour. With this 
formal shift, we find a directly personal relationship of dependency is upheld where 
the direct domination between persons is extended over time and formalised in a 
contract. As in the case of landed property, the owner of the fictitious capital is Lord 
up until fictitious capital becomes valorised. Once fictitious capital is valorised the 
directly personal contract disappears and we once again enter the world of 
impersonal exchange.  
 The fact that fictitious capital eludes the valorisation process and thus capital 
realisation, is in line with the ontological claim that Marx’s theory of valorisation is 
making: there is no value without the expenditure of human effort through labour that 
is then represented abstractly by the measurement of labour time used to produce 
value as an abstract form. Thus ‘surplus value’ appears as the portion of the working 
day that seems to be paid. This is due to wage representation that covers over a 
portion of time that is in fact unpaid labour time. The premise that capital 
accumulates from seemingly nothing is based on the extraction of value from labour, 
where the value extracted exceeds the amount paid in wages. While fictitious capital 
is fictitious based on that this form of capital did not go through the circulation 
process, this also means that fictitious capital is fictitious because it does not contain 
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its premise in labour. In this way, fictitious capital has come to “evade the conditions 
of the circulation of capital”30 and thus commodity circulation and production.  
 The increased use of fictitious capital that has evaded the conditions of 
production is something seemingly in contrast to the fact that we have nonetheless 
seen an intensification of industrial factory work and thus the proliferation of labour-
time functioning as a measure of value. This dynamic has paradoxically been driven 
by investments in technology that have limited the need for labour, creating relative 
surplus value. This production of relative surplus value over time leads to the 
depletion of the primary source of value, which is labour producing absolute surplus 
value.  However, on a broader scale, capitalists that cannot invest in technology are 
forced to compensate through devaluing the cost of labour power in order to be able 
to compete with the change in socially necessary labour time that has been 
redefined by relative surplus value. This is a driving factor behind the falling rate of 
profit that becomes compensated for by finance capital through the evasion of 
production and the extraction of profit in circulation. Postone characterises this 
dynamic as follows: 
 
With the increase of productivity, you have increases in material wealth greater 
than increases of surplus value but surplus value remains central to the 
system. This means that the system generates accelerating production, using 
the accelerating use of raw materials for smaller and smaller increases in 
surplus value.31  
 
Tomba has further pointed out that the idea that there has been a decrease in labour 
that facilities the abstract labour embedded in the value-form is profoundly one sided 
and can be said to be true “only in relation to the productive force and intensity of a 
socially necessary labour-time [where the] average does not pass through the north-
western and non-US axes.”32  It is this dynamic that is at the centre of Chakrabarty’s 
argument in Provincializing Europe in which he describes how with the majority of 
socially necessary labour time occurring in the global south, the dominant 
temporarily of global capitalism needs to be understood from a renewed 
perspective. Labour time, internal to the generation of value in capitalist societies has 
in fact increased, yet has been greatly devalued by low wages in the global south. 
While in countries where capital accumulation is centrally organised, industry has 
greatly depleted and has been replaced largely with unemployment and low paying 
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service industry jobs, combined with the increased creation of value through the M-
M relation of fictitious capital. As Postone has noted, in this dynamic, the increase of 
productivity occurs without the increase and even decline of surplus value, that 
nonetheless remains structurally central. Here we find that “value’s growing 
inadequacies as a measure of social wealth remains the necessary structural 
presupposition of capitalist society, and this is the basis of capitalisms fundamental 
contradiction.”33 This contradiction is between value as the product of labour and the 
potential for other forms of wealth to develop, such as fictitious capital, representing 
a historical contradiction internal to capital (as stressed by Marx) that capitalist social 
relations at once create the conditions for the possibility of generating new forms of 
wealth while the general realization of this new form of wealth is constrained by old 
forms (i.e. value’s reliance on labour). 
 Fictitious capital is speculative in nature as it exists as the placeholder for a 
dialectical result of the reversed movement between the universal object of 
exchange (money) and labour. This process is premised on fictitious capital’s 
disappearance at the moment of valorisation. When fictitious capital is repaid, 
instead of valorising the the capital, the repayment eliminates the fictional element 
and the fictitious capital no longer exists. Hence, fictitious capital does not exist 
beyond the moment of the result of the speculative proposition that future labour will 
supply its repayment and so fictitious capital is always money advanced for future 
labour not yet secured. In Hegelian terms fictitious capital represents a determinant 
‘nothingness’ that negates the contradiction that contains within it a weakness that 
will fall apart by the end of its movement. The function of fictitious capital is then at 
once less and more than the actual function of money as commodity because 
‘fictitious capital’ does not contain the same boundaries as other money 
commodities do, nor does it require the same labour relations. However, fictitious 
capital’s speculative nature is but a derivative expression of another type of 
exploitation: production and the corresponding extraction of surplus value. That is, 
the doubling of fictitious capital is a mere appearance of a sum initially extracted as 
surplus value from wage labour. For Marx, anything fictitious (or speculative) will at 
some point return to the real and at that moment the illusion will no longer suffice as 
a placeholder for valorised capital. This is considered to be by Marx a major cause 
for cyclical crisis in the history of capitalism. Using the same amount of money more 
than once is itself a contraction and at some point the mystification will concretely 
reveal its material inadequacies. Yet, the more strain placed on the production 
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process (decrease in wages, outsourcing of labour etc.) the less it is possible for 
fictitious capital to be valorised since when production is weak it becomes 
increasingly difficult for interest on loans, bonds or investments to be recovered, let 
alone repayment. Further, this suspension of valorisation is the very program of the 
financier since so long as interest payments are recovered, a permanent suspension 
of repayment is in their favour. Meanwhile, the suspension of valorisation imposes a 
very different kind of exploitation of the subject than seen in wage labour, as the 
movement towards valuation becomes based not only on the discipline of our time 
spent engaging in labour, but our ability to be someone who can labour in the future. 
Our free time is therefore overdetermined by the struggle to reproduce our labour 
power further. A crucial part of the legitimation of fictitious capital relies on the 
constitution of a corresponding subject who lives a life that is pathologically driven 
towards the ability to repay and pay for what has been credited to them. However, 
exploitation outside of the confines of the working day is not unique to the function of 
fictitious capital as exploitation of one’s whole life is also a central aspect of 
consumer culture, colonization, the disciplining of the unemployed, women’s unpaid 
work as well as explicitly political forms of domination.  Thus we can see that 
capitalism bases itself on the heterogeneity of different types of exploitation, namely 
the exploitation of wage labour and one’s life in society that together make up the 
contradictory unity of production on one side and realization on the other.  
 
Social Reproduction and Personal Domination  
 
What is generally overlooked in Marxian value-form theorizations of 
impersonal abstract domination is how the labour commodity, that functions as the 
premise for the abstraction, is produced and reproduced. The study of such is 
referred to as ‘social reproduction theory.’ A theory that has been developed counter 
to socialist feminist theory, which has sought to understand the relationship between 
women’s oppression and capital based on the analysis of dual systems of 
oppression, later revised as triple systems to include race, class and gender. This 
form of analysis implies that each system has its own history and thus interacts in 
people’s lives separately, informing aspects of what feminist theory calls 
intersectionality. From this point of view Marxism is often understood reductively as a 
tool to understand class only and is not seen as a theoretical field that can help us to 
understand other forms of social exclusion or power structures, such as domination 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






by way of abstractions. In contrast, social reproduction theory assumes that Marxian 
theory can be extended to encompass not only gender and race but a wide realm of 
diverse forms of exclusion that determine how one relates to the production process, 
a process that is understood to impose forms of impersonal abstract domination that 
cannot be reduced to a class analysis. This framework is developed with focus on 
the reproduction of labour-power in capitalist societies based on the observation that 
while capitalist accumulation relies on labour, it does not produce labour.  Further, 
“there is no mechanism in the direct labour/capital relation to ensure labour’s daily 
and generational renewal.”34  As a result, daily and generational renewal of labour is 
ensured at the level of kinship structures and individual consumption. Social relations 
that are internally structured based on personal forms of domination as the realm of 
social reproduction regulates daily survival and reproduction such as eating, 
sleeping, sexuality, general caring for each other and raising children. As Vogel 
explains, 
 
The bearers of labour-power are, however, mortal. Those who work suffer 
wear and tear. Some are too young to participate in the labour-process, others 
too old. Eventually, every individual dies. Some process that meets the 
ongoing personal needs of the bearers of labour-power as human individuals 
is therefore a condition of social reproduction, as is some process that 
replaces workers who have died or withdrawn from the active work force. 
These processes of maintenance and replacement are often imprecisely, if 
usefully, conflated under the term reproduction of labour-power.35  
 
It is within the general framework of what Vogel refers to as a ‘unitary theory of social 
reproduction’ that reproduction of labour power is understood as internal to capitalist 
totality. This means that we cannot understand personal forms of domination as pre-
capitalist, or post-capitalist, but forms implicit to the dynamic of capitalist social 
relations themselves. The theoretical premise of a ‘unitary theory of social 
reproduction’ is based on the inherent internal differentiation within the concept of 
totality. To quote the famous rational extracted by Vogel, Marx claimed  
 
The Maintenance and Reproduction of the working class is and must ever be 
a necessary condition to the reproduction of Capital. But the capitalist may 
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safely leave its fulfilment to the labourer’s instincts of self-preservation and of 
propagation.36 
 
Within Marxian social ontology, what Marx refers to as instincts will of course always 
be symptomatic of historically specific social relations. Hence it is within the concept 
of so called ‘instincts of self-preservation and of propagation’ that Marx leaves within 
his framework of capitalist totality room for the insertion of a theory of social 
reproduction that is inclusive of those whose lives are determined by differentiated 
social forms of domination and thus are at once excluded from labouring (or aspects 
of their their lives are) and appropriated to uphold the maintenance of labour.  
Significantly, social reproduction does not premise its analysis on the idea that 
social reproduction necessarily relies on a gendered division of labour, kinship 
relations or the organizational foundation of the nuclear family. But rather, there are 
also other ways that capitalism has found to renew labour power through ensuring 
daily maintenance, and to facilitate the regeneration of new labour forces that have 
been so far outside of the current labour force. A process that is maintained “through 
hierarchically and oppressively structured institutions and practices, such as private 
households, welfare states, slavery and global labour markets.”37 Gendered forms of 
violence, colonial, racial and the exclusion of anyone who is unable to themselves 
labour, are thus central to the constitution of labour itself. This is due to the fact that 
the site of social reproduction is at once the site that produces and reproduces 
labour power, and also the site that produces and reproduces life qua life regardless 
of whether one is able to labour or not. Hence any form of exclusion from the market 
place, from racial exclusion and old age to increased unemployment or under 
employment, imposes additional stress on the realm of social reproduction.  How 
then does fictitious capital’s suspension of capital realisation intensify these personal 
forms of domination in the realm of social reproduction? 
 
It is the suspension of labour time that reveals and brings to the fore the 
aggregate of personal forms of domination found in the realm of social reproduction, 
always already present but often hidden in production.  This is because the 
subjective domination of the one who bears the fictitious copy of money capital (or 
credit money) entails that it is the very subjectivity of the bearer of fictitious capital 
that becomes the mediator between production and consumption. This subject has 
to prove themselves as a subject who can produce future valorisation and thus 
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prove to be a subject who can reproduce their labour power. This subject, generally 
foreclosed from the possibility of engaging in the actual production necessary for full 
repayment, then is required to stage themselves as actively apt at reproducing their 
labour power. The actual production of labour power is then a state that is upheld in 
suspension along with capital’s valorisation. Here the personal forms of social 
domination intrinsic to social reproduction becomes a central justification to to the 
legitimation of capitals very production of more value through the M-M relation. One 
must prove that they are able to command the kinds of domination needed for the 
production of their labour power or the production of future social wealth that will 
stand in for the fictitious capital in the future. Further, 'debtors' are mainly not 
individuals but financial institutions such as banks and hedge-funds who speculate 
on future production. Therefore, the power dynamic is not a straight-
forward dichotomy between agents. However, when much of the money being used 
in the economy is fictitious that means that money in use is not a product of 
circulation and thus on a societal level has transposed the labour needed to uphold 
it from the past to the future. In this way, the production process that upholds this 
form of capital has been transposed to the future as well and so as a society many of 
the people who should have been subjected to the past process of production are 
subjected to the future process, meaning they have to appear as able to labour in the 
future, and thus be able to reproduce their labour in the present. Crucially, if future 
labour is indefinitely suspended so is the necessity to reproduce the pending labour. 
Hence, whether or not fictitious capital is repaid (much of fictitious capital is never 
repaid but rather re-bundled and sold as financial assets), society must nonetheless 
act ‘as if’ it will be repaid in the future. This can surface in the form of self-discipline 
(in Foucault’s sense), yet this also has societal effects bearing on the structures of 
domination that socially uphold the possibility of reproducing labour power and thus 
culminates the increase of violence against those who themselves are already 
excluded from the production process and whose lives are appropriated for the 
upkeep of the possibility of labour power. Especially forms of exclusion from labour 
markets. Here the personal nature of domination, as the manifestation of the latent 
abstraction indicative of the value-form, infiltrates one’s ‘whole life.’  
What is most striking about this analysis of ‘fictitious capital,’ as a form 
facilitating the renewed emergence of directly personal power within the process of 
capital valorisation, is the strong contradiction this implies as Marx claimed that 
fictitious capital is capital’s most fetishized form and therefore most impersonal. The 
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great issue will be to decide whether these combinations of the personal and the 
impersonal merely reactivate or displace forms of subjection, or whether they 
genuinely produce unprecedented figures of the legitimation of capitalist social 
relations. 
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